Jubal Early’s Trains: The Battle of Lynchburg in Historical Memory by Marks, John G.
University of Lynchburg
Digital Showcase @ University of Lynchburg
Undergraduate Theses and Capstone Projects
Fall 10-2009
Jubal Early’s Trains: The Battle of Lynchburg in
Historical Memory
John G. Marks
Lynchburg College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalshowcase.lynchburg.edu/utcp
Part of the Military History Commons, Other History Commons, and the United States History
Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Showcase @ University of Lynchburg. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Undergraduate Theses and Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of Digital Showcase @ University of Lynchburg. For more information,
please contact digitalshowcase@lynchburg.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marks, John G., "Jubal Early’s Trains: The Battle of Lynchburg in Historical Memory" (2009). Undergraduate Theses and Capstone
Projects. 80.
https://digitalshowcase.lynchburg.edu/utcp/80
John G. Marks 
Senior Honors Project
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the graduation requirements of the Westover Honors Program
Westover Honors Program 
October 2009
Jubal Early’s Trains: The Battle of Lynchburg in Historical Memory
Barbara Rothermel
Dr. Lindsay Eades
Dr. Kirt von Daacke, Committee Chair
On June 18, 1901, Charles Minor Blackford, brother of Battle of Lynchburg veteran 
Eugene Blackford, made a speech commemorating the thirty-five year anniversary of the 
Lynchburg Campaign. In the Battle of Lynchburg, as a part of the wider Shenandoah Valley 
campaign of 1864, General Jubal Early and the Confederate force defended the city from 
General David Hunter and the Union in a two-day engagement, marked mostly by skirmishing. 
Blackford stated in this speech that, “During the night of the 17th, a yard engine, with box cars 
attached, was run up and down the Southside Railroad, making as much noise as possible, and 
thus induced Hunter to believe and to report that Early was being rapidly reinforced.”1 2While 
this story of the cunning of Confederate leadership is compelling, it is not referenced at any time 
before this speech, more than thirty years after the end of the war; additionally, all subsequent 
published accounts of the battle accept and reproduce Blackford’s story. Furthermore, no first 
hand accounts, even those of Confederate general and future Lost Cause proponent Jubal Early, 
make any reference to this ruse. After the Civil War, the history of the Battle of Lynchburg 
evolved into a myth exemplifying Confederate leadership and the sacrifices of Confederate 
soldiers through the embellishment, and sometimes fabrication, of the facts of the story in post­
war recollections of the battle. The question, then, is why did Southern memories of the Civil 
War undergo such significant transformations in the years after the war?
Gaines M. Foster uses the theory of the Lost Cause to help explain how the memory of 
the Civil War evolved for the people of the South. In his discussion of post-war recollections, 
such as the above account created by Blackford, Foster states that:
1 Charles Minor Blackford, Campaign and Battle o f Lynchburg (Lynchburg: JP Bell Press,
1901), 22.
2 “Lost Cause” refers generally to the theory that attributes Confederate defeat only to the fact 
that the Union had far more and better supplied soldiers, and not to any advantage in the quality 
of their soldiers or officers; the theory asserts that, had Confederate officers been afforded the 
same numerical advantages, the Confederacy would have won the war.
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Although this Confederate celebration had its roots in the persisting anxieties 
resulting from defeat, increasing fears generated by the social changes of the late 
nineteenth century provided the immediate impetus for the revived interest in the 
Lost Cause. In the public commendation of the Confederate cause and its 
soldiers, veterans and other southerners found relief from the lingering fear that 
defeat had somehow dishonored them. At the same time, the rituals and rhetoric 
of celebration offered a memory of personal sacrifice and a model of social order
that met the needs of a society experiencing rapid change and disorder.3
The contemporary accounts of the Battle of Lynchburg fit this paradigm neatly. These 
recollections only refer to the primary accounts when they fit in with the narrative of 
personal sacrifice and exceptional courage in the face of insurmountable odds. The 
acquired importance and perceived accuracy of a story supported only by scant, 
circumstantial evidence at best, like the story of “Jubal Early’s trains,” and the 
development of new emphases in the story of the Battle of Lynchburg fits Foster’s model. 
Foster explains that these transformed memories, “helped explain to late nineteenth- 
century southerners how and why they lost the war that marked the end of the Old South.
It helped them cope with the cultural implications of defeat. It served to ease their 
adjustment to the New South and to provide social unity during the crucial period of 
transition.”* 4 The development of the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg epitomizes the 
type of transformation of historical memory described by Foster.
David W. Blight also offers explanation for the development of Civil War myths and the 
transformation of American historical memory.5 Because of the breadth of Blight’s work -  it 
addresses the memory of the Civil War in the entire nation, as opposed to Foster’s work which 
looks exclusively at the southern perspective -  the Lost Cause theory which plays such a central
Games M. Foster, Ghosts o f the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence o f 
the New South, 1865 to 1913 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 7.
4 Ibid., 7.
5 David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001).
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role in Foster’s work serves a more ancillary function in that of Blight. Blight does, however, 
discuss the role the Lost Cause played in the development of American Civil War memory. 
Blight states, “The Lost Cause took root in a southern culture awash in an admixture of physical 
destruction, the psychological trauma of defeat...and with time, an abiding sentimentalism...It 
took hold in specific arguments, organizations, and rituals, and for many Southerners, it became 
a natural extension of evangelical piety, a civil religion that helped them link their sense of loss 
to a Christian conception of history.”6 7This reinforces the idea presented by Foster that the 
primary consequences of defeat first spawned the development of Civil War myth and memory 
in the South. As such, it lends further credence to the presumption that the myth of the Battle of 
Lynchburg developed as a result of the complex consequences of defeat. The development of 
the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg seems to be a product of this “abiding sentimentalism,” as it 
exemplified and dramatized the Confederate effort and sacrifices.
After 1865, American remembrances of the Civil War underwent significant changes, at 
first as a result of the trauma caused by the war’s unprecedented suffering, and later as a reaction 
to the social changes of the New South. Southerners actively transformed their memories of the 
Civil War in an effort to “[ease] the region’s passage through a particularly difficult period of
 
social change.”7 As a part of this phenomenon, the people of central Virginia emphasized, 
embellished, and engineered certain memories of the Battle of Lynchburg to reflect the honor 
and skill of Confederate leadership and the sacrifices of Confederate soldiers, rather than address 
the losses of their recent past and their impact on the challenges of their future.
The Battle of Lynchburg occurred as a part of the larger Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 
1864. This campaign played an integral role in the final outcome of the Civil War, and brought
6 Blight, 258.
7 Foster, 6.
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with it heavy casualties on both sides. From May 26, 1864, through the end of June of that year, 
Union and Confederate forces engaged in battles and, more frequently, skirmishes throughout the
Shenandoah Valley between Cedar Creek, Virginia and Meadow Bluff, West Virginia. Gary W. 
Gallagher describes how the 1864 campaign, “exceeded in scale and importance Stonewall 
Jackson’s more famous 1862 operations in the Shenandoah.”* 9 Gallagher also notes how, during 
this campaign, “The military and political stakes were immense. War on civilians first debuted 
on a theater wide-scale, and tactical operations ran the gamut from guerilla activity to the grand 
encounter at Cedar Creek.”10 The events of the Valley Campaign profoundly impacted the lives 
of both the military personnel and civilians unfortunate enough to experience it first hand.
Despite the existence of a number of detailed accounts of the events of the Battle of 
Lynchburg, none reference the “train ruse” which would later become the focal point of stories 
of the battle. Of all of the records from Confederate soldiers and officers at the Battle of 
Lynchburg, not one addressed attempts to deceive the Union forces. Union army accounts are 
similarly silent on the subject. Likewise, no civilian accounts of the battle -  whether in private 
correspondence or newspaper articles -  discuss hearing or participating in an attempt to trick the 
Union troops into thinking that the city already had received reinforcements from Richmond.
The lack of any first-hand accounts directly addressing an empty train being run over a bridge to 
deceive the enemy highlights the development of the historical memories of Southerners after the 
war; they actively transformed their memories to re-establish the honor, ability, and social
8
United States War Department, War o f the Rebellion (Gettysburg: National Historical Society, 
1971-72), Series 1, Volume 37, part I, 93.
9 Gary W Gallagher, Struggle for the Shenandoah (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press,
1991), ix.
10 Ibid, 19.
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dominance experienced by whites in the old South, or embraced histories that portrayed 
Confederates in a way that supported these ends.
Jubal Early noted on June 19, 1864, before the conflict at Lynchburg had even ended, 
that, “Last evening the enemy assaulted my lines in front of Lynchburg and was repulsed by the 
part of my command which was up. On the arrival of the rest of my command I made 
arrangements to attack this morning at light but it was discovered the enemy were retreating, and 
I am now pursuing.”11 *Early, the man who receives credit for designing the plan to deceive 
General Hunter and the Union troops, did not mention anything about running the train from the 
Southside railroad to achieve these ends. He stated that some of his command did indeed arrive 
that evening, but mentioned nothing of the ruse for which he would later receive credit. Even in 
his post-war memoirs Early does not mention running empty boxcars along the Southside 
railroad bridge. He noted that, because the remainder of his troops did not arrive from 
Charlottesville until late during the night of June 18, “arrangements were made for attacking 
Hunter at daylight on the 19, but some time after midnight it was discovered that he was moving, 
though it was not known whether he was retreating or moving so as to attack Lynchburg on the 
south where it was vulnerable, or to attempt to joint Grant on the south side of the James 
River.” The contrast between Early’s contemporary account of a relatively uneventful 
interaction and the post-war memories of his valiant salvation of the city again point to the 
transformation of the historical memory of the people of central Virginia and to formation of the
11 Report of Gen Jubal A. Early, June 19, 1864, War o f the Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 37, Part
I, 160.
Jubal Anderson Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative o f the War Between the States 
(electronic edition) Academic Affairs Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, 1999.
12
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myth of the Battle of Lynchburg as a way to bolster their sense of honor of after a defeat which 
destroyed the institution of slavery, and with it the basis for social order in the old South.
From the Union perspective, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton described in his report 
of the Battle of Lynchburg on June 21, 1864, just three days after the battle, that “General Hunter 
attacked Lynchburg on Saturday last and was repulsed....the attack was nothing more than a 
reconnaissance.”13 Similarly, Franklin E. Town, Captain of the Union Signal Corps, noted, “We 
marched towards Lynchburg, crossing the Blue Ridge at the Peaks of Otter. We skirmished 
continually with the enemy after passing Staunton, and on the 17th of June pushed him into his 
works at Lynchburg...on the 18th we fought to gain possession of their works and the city but 
failed to do so.”14 Town makes no reference to hearing trains running through the night, and 
attributes the Union retreat simply to an inability to take the city effectively and efficiently; he 
offers no indication that the fear of confederate reinforcement provided the impetus for retreat. 
Similarly, the report of Brigadier General George Cook, commander of the US Army’s Second 
Infantry Division, offers no indication that the Union had been forced to retreat from fear of 
reinforcements. Discussing his actions immediately after arriving with his force outside of 
Lynchburg, he stated, “When I arrived at these cross-roads General Averell had already passed 
and was engaging the enemy at the church on the hill beyond. Upon my arrival at the church the 
enemy began to show themselves in considerable force and were pressing back our skirmish 
line...part of this brigade had already turned the enemy’s works, but by this time it had become 
so dark and not knowing the ground the pursuit was discontinued.”15 While Cook did mention 
Confederate reinforcement, it is in reference to the force they actually confronted, not one they
13 Stanton, Edwin M., War o f the Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 40, Part II, 27.
14 Town, Franklin E., War o f the Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 37, Part I, 108.
15 Report of Brig Gen George Cook, War o f the Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 37, part I, 121.
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feared had arrived during the night. Cook continued, “Next morning I was sent to the right with 
my division to make a reconnaissance for the purpose of turning the enemy’s left. Found it 
impracticable after marching some three or four miles, and just returned with my division and 
got it in position to support General Sullivan’s division when the enemy made an attack on our 
lines. On the retreat this evening my division brought up the rear.”16 17*Again, although Cook 
noted that the Confederate force in Lynchburg had forced the Union troops to retreat, he made no 
reference to hearing trains coming in through the night. None of these military accounts, 
Confederate and Union alike, referred to Jubal Early’s Trains.
Civilian accounts likewise included no references to the story of the train ruse, though 
some reported detailed descriptions of other events of the battle. In a letter written by Liberty 
resident Frederick Anspach to his brother Robert on June 23, 1864, he discussed the events of the 
battle which had occurred only a few days earlier. He described in vivid detail how, two days 
before the Battle of Lynchburg, Hunter and his army came through the city, an “in 10 minutes 
after they arrived, the Depot, Hay house and Turpin’s House were in a flame. The Steam Mill 
was burnt, also the Reese Hospital, RR track tom up, little and big Otter bridges burnt, etc, 
etc...They took flour from us, all our onions. We had but little, consequently, lost but little.
That little however we feel sensibly.” He continued, “Some were treated worse than we were. 
They didn’t ransack or pillage our house at all, except the basement...The two negro women 
who that lived with us (Emily and Mary) and Joe (Mary’s Husband) left with the Yankees.” 
Anspach described these events in vivid detail, but when he described the battle, he noted only 
that “The enemy marched on Lynchburg, where they met our forces, a fight ensued, and the
16 Ibid.
17 Letter from Frederick Anspach to Robert Anspach. 23 June 1864, Liberty, VA. Papers of the
Anspach Family, Special Collections Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.
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enemy commenced to beat a retreat, in haste, if not confusion.”18 While Anspach clearly would 
have spent more time explaining to his brother the events directly pertinent to their family and 
home, he demonstrated in his description of the events in Liberty the rapidity with which news 
traveled in the area. He referenced the major actors in the conflict, and even cited early but 
nonetheless accurate casualty numbers. His account does not, however, fit in anyway with the 
conflict described in recollections of the battle at the turn of the century by Charles Blackford 
and various others.
Similarly, the Lynchburg newspaper, The Daily Virginian, did not make reference to a 
train being run throughout the night. In its first issue after the battle, on June 21, 1864, the paper 
shared specifics about the conflict: “On Friday morning it was ascertained that the enemy had 
approached within a few miles of the city, and in the afternoon the booming of artillery was 
heard on the Lynchburg and Salem Turnpike road, near the old Quaker Church, about three miles 
distant...After the fight at the Quaker Church, on Friday Afternoon, further hostilities were 
suspended until Saturday morning.” It continued, “The battle ended on Saturday afternoon, and 
the enemy retreated in great haste on Saturday night. Had they remained until the next day, we 
are satisfied from the dispositions that had been made by Gen Early, that they would have been 
captured.” Interestingly, the paper also noted that “Stationed at all the passes by which ingress to 
the city was afforded, it was not doubted that the militia, the reserves, the convalescent soldiers, 
and the volunteers would be able to keep the enemy at bay until reinforcements could arrive.”19 
Again, as with the other civilian and military accounts, the Lynchburg newspaper described the 
battle in great detail, but did not mention any Confederate efforts to deceive the Union troops 
because of a discrepancy in the size of their forces. This account likewise dovetails neatly with
8
19 Lynchburg Virginian, 21 June 1864, p 1.
18 Ibid.
other first hand accounts of the war, but is in conflict with the Blackford account in its omission
of the story of the train ruse.
Blackford’s own wife, Susan Blackford, in her letter to him just three days after the 
battle, also failed to mention the story of the train ruse, though she did include details consistent 
with other first-hand accounts. She wrote, “It is amusing to me, reading your letters from the 
17 and 19 to see how little idea you had of the stirring times through which we were passing
in Lynchburg...[General Early] arrived with some troops on the evening of Friday the 17th, but 
could do little more than get what he had into positions.” She continued, pointing out how there 
“was no general engagement, but was a constant cannonade and heavy skirmishing went on all 
day...it was fascinating beyond all description.”20 Susan Blackford demonstrated detailed 
knowledge of the battle, but did not mention the train ruse, nor a great disparity in troop levels. 
Further, if it is assumed, as Peter W. Houck suggests in his introduction to the updated, 
published, 1984 version of Blackford’s Campaign and Battle, that “[Blackford’s] brother Eugene 
fought in the battle, so the two brothers must have discussed the event in detail” then surely his 
communications with his wife about the battle also contributed to his knowledge of its events,
but she did not mention the story of the train ruse.21
The contemporary accounts of the battle consistently establish other facts with which 
later accounts conflict, in addition to the story of the train ruse. First, they establish that the 
number of troops on either side was at least relatively even, though the Union did outnumber the
20 Letter, Susan Blackford to Charles Blackford, 21 June 1864, Lynchburg, VA. Reprinted in the 
1994 edition of Campaign and Battle o f Lynchburg, Virginia, by Charles Minor Blackford 
(Lynchburg: Warwick House Publishing, 1994).
21 Houck’s assertion that the familial relationship between Eugene and Charles Blackford 
directly implies that they would have communicated about the events of the battle is an 
extremely weak assertion, one based purely on speculation. I have found no specific evidence of 
correspondence between the two brothers directly related to the battle; thus, it is impossible to 
assess with any certainty the impact and content of correspondence between the brothers.
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Confederacy. While it is difficult to discern exact numbers, Gary W. Gallagher estimates the 
disparity in troops at “a few thousand men,” a small difference relative to Civil War standards, 
and one which would not have offered the Union a significant strategic advantage. Second, they 
establish that Hunter’s force slowly approached the city of Lynchburg, tearing up railroads and 
communication lines, and generally wreaking havoc on the communities in their path. Third, 
that the military action of the Confederate forces repulsed the Union attempt to take the city. 
These elements declined in their presence and importance in more modem recollections of the 
battle, as people of Lynchburg began to emphasize Confederate heroics and sacrifices through 
the embellishment and fabrication of the facts of the story.
The myth of the Battle of Lynchburg began to develop around the turn of the twentieth 
century. Beginning in force with the publication of the Blackford speech, accounts of the Battle 
of Lynchburg began to center around the story of Jubal Early’s train ruse, the incompetence and 
cowardice of Federal officers, and the sacrifices and valiance of Confederate officers and 
soldiers in an ultimately doomed effort. No longer focusing on the correspondences about and 
primary accounts of the battle, these recollections of the war, which began to appear around the 
turn of the century, constituted the key sources in almost all subsequent historical analyses of the 
battle.
W. Asbury Christian already included many of the elements of this myth in his 1900 
work Lynchburg and its People, a classic example of turn of the century local history and 
genealogy that candidly captures the Lynchburg Zeitgeist. While it predates Blackford’s speech 
and subsequent publication, Christian demonstrates that a number of the elements of the myth of 
the Battle of Lynchburg had already been established by 1900. For instance, while it did not 
mention the train mse that Blackford would introduce the following year, it characterized the
10
Union leadership and their decision to retreat as unequivocally cowardly. Christian stated, 
“Terrible volleys were poured into them, when they broke and fled, seeking a hole for 
themselves. Saturday evening the battle ended, and at night, like the Arab, General Hunter 
quietly folded his tent and stole away.”22 This description of the Union retreat characterized
them as cowards (an element of the myth which gained particular prominence), especially when 
juxtaposed with the reverence paid to the Confederate leadership, particularly Jubal Early. 
Christian characterized Early almost as a new Moses, who saved the people of Lynchburg: “A 
thrill of joy went like an electric shock through the whole place as the train came over the bridge 
into the city...When the soldiers disembarked, cheer after cheer rent the air. Early had come, 
and Lynchburg was safe once more.”23 Early described this event far differently, stating “I 
accompanied Ramseur’s division, going on the front train, but the road and rolling stock were in 
such bad condition that I did not reach Lynchburg until about one o’clock in the afternoon, and 
the other trains were much later.”24 After this, he continued only to describe the state of 
Confederate forces at the time of his arrival, and his analysis of the military situation. He made 
no mention of the crowds Christian stated had awaited his arrival, nor anything about men 
hanging off the outside of the train. While it is certainly possible that the people of Lynchburg 
celebrated the arrival of Early and reinforcements, and that the train carrying Jubal Early very 
well may have been crowded with soldiers, the available primary accounts of the battle offer 
nothing close to the level of detail provided by Christian. The characterization of the Union 
troops and officers as cruel and cowardly, the description of the nature of the fighting as well as 
the attitudes of Confederate troops and Lynchburg civilians, and the almost religious reverence
22 W Asbury Christian, Lynchburg and its People (Lynchburg: JP Bell Company, Inc, 1900),
221 .
23 Ibid, 221.
24 Memoirs of Jubal Early, 373.
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paid to Jubal Early in Christian’s account, published thirty-five years after the Civil War, 
highlight the extent to which the development of the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg informed 
his description.
Christian’s account as well demonstrated other elements which point to the development 
of the myth. In his description of the aftermath of the battle, he noted how, “In Lynchburg there 
was quite a difference between this Sunday and the one preceding. Now there was a joy of 
deliverance; before there was the gloom of impending ruin...About one hundred dead Yankees 
were strewn over the field, many of whom were nude and terribly tom by shells; others were shot 
through the head and heart, showing the accurate aim of our men.” Again, Christian’s reference 
to a “joy of deliverance” highlights Early as something of a religious savior for the people and 
city of Lynchburg. His description of nude bodies and soldiers shot “through the head and heart” 
also represent details absent from contemporary accounts. This as well represents development 
of the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg, as the story transforms from a relatively anti-climactic 
series of skirmishes to one in which the city is saved by one man’s seemingly divine 
intervention. Further, while Christian’s approximation of Union dead is fairly accurate, he 
included details not found in the primary accounts: the attitudes of Lynchburg citizens, the 
incredible skill and valiance of Confederate troops and officers, and the cowardly and evil nature 
of the Union. These details represent embellishments of the realities of the battle and 
developments of the myth, designed to glorify the memory of the Confederates and the Old 
South.
The year after the publication of Christian’s local history, Charles Blackford delivered his 
speech about the campaign and battle, including all of the aforementioned elements that 25
25 Christian, 221.
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constitute the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg. Blackford vividly described how “The residue of 
Early’s command did not reach Lynchburg until late on the afternoon of the 18th, when it was 
hurried through the city at a double quick, much to the relief of the citizens, who cheered them 
on their pathway.”26 Here, Blackford introduced the idea that Early and his troops arrived in 
Lynchburg to save the city at the last possible moment, an idea which became an important 
element of the myth, and would be incorporated into all future accounts of the battle. Blackford 
also stated, as previously mentioned, how “During the night of the 17th a yard engine, with box 
cars attached, was run up and down the Southside Railroad, making as much noise as possible, 
and thus induced Hunter to believe and to report that Early was being rapidly reinforced.27” This 
marked the first time a description of the train ruse appeared publicly. While it is impossible to 
determine whether Blackford invented the story or simply became the first to declare and record 
a story that had developed locally during the years between the end of the war and the time of the 
speech, Blackford’s account of Jubal Early’s trains marks its first appearance in any available 
record. Also fitting with the myth, Blackford noted how the confederate forces numbered “little 
over one-half as large as that under Hunter.” Blackford’s seeming invention of the tram ruse 
story is the most prominent element of the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg, as it demonstrates 
the genius and cunning of Confederate leadership against a far more numerous opponent; in 
addition to these things however, Blackford’s account also establishes the idea that Jubal Early 
arrived to Lynchburg just in time to stave off a Union invasion of the city, and that the 
Confederate forces were vastly outnumbered. He praises the efforts of General Early, while 
disparaging those of General Hunter. These “facts” would all develop into key elements of the
26 Blackford, 23.
27 Ibid
28 Ibid.
13
memory of the Battle of Lynchburg for many of the people of central Virginia. Further, the 
Blackford account became the most authoritative source on the history of the Battle, despite the 
fact that he was not there when it occurred. In the vast majority of historical recollections of the 
battle after 1901, Blackford’s account generally represents one of the most frequently referenced
29sources.
Similarly, in 1904, John Terrell, who served as a surgeon in one of the Lynchburg war
hospitals during the battle, described his experiences. He described Hunter’s force as “estimated
at 30 or 40,000 troops,” well higher than the actual number, further perpetuating the idea that
Jubal Early and his men were vastly outmanned, yet somehow managed to overcome the enemy.
Additionally, after describing some of the events of the battle, he noted how:
If Gen Early with his army, had reached Lynchburg a few hours 
sooner...Hunter’s army would not, we thought, have escaped, although his troops 
were fresh and well equipped and nearer twice the numbers in Gen Early’s army, 
whose veterans had been actively engaged in the field from May 4th in the 
Wilderness fight to Cold Harbor in June with their ranks depleted by casualties of 
battles and seemingly worn out. Yet on the firing line, June 18th, they seemed 
bright, dashing, self confident and eager to meet the foe.
Here, Terrell surmised that had it not been for their depleted ranks and exhaustion, Confederate
soldiers would have somehow captured or more convincingly defeated Hunter’s army. This
29 Blackford’s account is cited as source for information about Battle of Lynchburg in: George 
Morris and Susan Foutz, Lynchburg in the Civil War: the City, the People, the Battle, 
(Lynchburg: H.E. Howard, Inc., 1984), 46; Phillip Lightfoot Scruggs, The History o f Lynchburg, 
Virginia, 1786-1946, (Lynchburg: J.P. Bell Press) 103-110; James M. Elson, Lynchburg, 
Virginia: the First Two Hundred Years, 1786-1986, (Lynchburg: Warwick House Publishers, 
2004), 171-172; Dorothy Potter and Clifton Potter, Lynchburg: 1757-2007, (Charleston, SC: 
Arcadia Publishing, 2007), 54; Darrell Laurant, Remembering Lynchburg and Central Virginia: 
Articles from the News & Advance, (Charleston, SC: History Press, 2005), 26-27; Dorothy Potter 
and Clifton Potter, Lynchburg: The Most Interesting Spot, (Lynchburg: Beric Press, 1985), 74- 
75.
30 JJ Terrell, Transcription of speech made to Gardland-Rodes Sons of Confederate Veterans
Camp, (Not Published: ‘Battle of Lynchburg File,’ Jones Memorial Library, Lynchburg, 
Virginia, ca. 1904)
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implies that the entire outcome of the war may have been different if it had not been for being so 
far outnumbered, and so tired from fighting this larger force in the preceding months. This all 
fits in with the myth: an exhausted fighting force valiantly defending their city against forty- 
thousand Union troops. It is unclear why, primarily in his assessment of troop numbers, Terrell’s 
account of the Battle differed from other eye-witness accounts recorded closer to the time of the 
battle. It could perhaps be attributed to a growing sense of sentimentalism as time passed, or 
possibly influence from the popularity of Blackford’s account, but regardless of the reason, the 
facts of Terrell’s account, recorded thirty years after the Battle, do not fit with the contemporary 
accounts.
The development of the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg continued through the early 
twentieth-century, as demonstrated in the remarks of Captain Tipton D. Jennings, Chairman of 
the Gardland-Rodes Camp of Confederate Veterans, in 1912. The influence of the myth in 
Jennings’s remarks is highlighted in his focus on the sacrifices of the Confederate soldiers and 
officers, an element which played a more ancillary role in previous secondary recollections of 
the battle. He states, “And it shall come to pass, when your children say unto you, ‘What mean 
ye by this service?’ A true index to greatness is gratitude...A people forgetful of sacrifices of 
others, endured to deliver them from impending horrors are unworthy of the world’s respect.”31 
Though definitely present in the aforementioned secondary recollections of the battle, the 
concept of a shared debt of gratitude to those who fought and died played an integral role in 
these remarks. This development demonstrates how the memory of the battle had shifted away 
from military strategy and specifics, and developed rather into a story of fantastic Confederate
31 Tipton D. Jennings, “Battle of Lynchburg” (transcription from Lynchburg Advance, Jones 
Memorial Library, Lynchburg, Virginia, 1912).
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effort and sacrifice. This re-emphasis on new elements of the story of the Battle of Lynchburg 
highlights the development of the myths surrounding it.
Furthermore, Jennings deferred to Charles Blackford’s account of the Battle of 
Lynchburg, stating, “No attempt has been made to narrate but the sidelights so to speak, of the 
deliverance of Lynchburg on the 18th of June, 1864, however interesting a full and complete 
history of that important campaign would prove. Right here let us refer the reader to 
‘Blackford’s’ pamphlet on this ‘Campaign and Battle.’”32 This deference to Blackford’s account 
as the most complete synthesis of the events of the Battle of Lynchburg represents the first 
instance of what would later develop into a pattern of citation of his account as historical fact. 
This mention of Blackford’s account carries with it two strong implications: that just over a 
decade after the delivery and publication of Charles Blackford’s remarks on the campaign and 
battle of Lynchburg, the story had acquired such widespread recognition that it could be referred 
to simply as “Blackford’s Pamphlet,” and that the details contained within said pamphlet had at 
the very least been introduced to many of the people of central Virginia. These secondary 
recollections all utilized first hand accounts to the extent that they meshed with their narrative, 
but often made assertions outside the purview of the primary documentation. Nevertheless, these 
post-war recollections developed into the “true” history of the Battle of Lynchburg.
Don P. Halsey perpetuated the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg in his description of the 
conflict in Historic and Heroic Lynchburg. The book represents a compilation of transcriptions 
from, “speeches I have been privileged to make on various occasions when we have assembled 
ourselves together to commemorate some of the people and deeds which have rendered
32 Jennings, “Battle of Lynchburg.”
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Lynchburg historic and heroic.”33 While his description of the battle, delivered in a memorial 
speech in April of 1924, focuses primarily on those involved in the conflict originally from 
Lynchburg, his characterization of Hunter and his praise of the Confederate effort clearly 
highlight the influence of the myth. Halsey described Hunter, pointing out how “The mildest 
terms that can be applied to him are renegade and coward,” and that “Hunter’s deeds were those 
of a malignant and cowardly fanatic who was better qualified to make war upon helpless women 
and children than upon armed soldiers.” 34 This characterization of Hunter falls clearly outside 
of the purview of the primary documentation, and clearly represents an opinion, yet he 
nonetheless presented it as fact. His description of the Confederate effort reflects how the myth 
developed to exemplify the heroics of the Confederates while thoroughly denigrating the actions 
of the Union forces. He described how the Confederate force had been “reduced to a ragged 
fragment of its former invincible legions, but [were] still animated by its dauntless and deathless 
spirit of valor,” and how on the day of the battle, “when [the city’s] existence was threatened by 
a cruel foe...it was saved by the blood of heroes.”35 The focus on the “dauntless spirit” of the 
Confederate soldiers and the cowardly character of the Union leadership highlights the influence 
of the myth and the transformation of the story of the Battle of Lynchburg in historical memory.
Another important aspect of Halsey’s account of the battle is the respect he paid to 
Blackford’s “Campaign and Battle.” He utilizes Blackford’s account for a number of 
descriptions of individuals from Lynchburg that participated in the battle, the reason for Hunter’s 
delay in reaching Lynchburg, as well as the proper memorialization of those responsible for the
33
Don P. Halsey, Historic and Heroic Lynchburg, (Lynchburg, 1935: J.P. Bell Press), v.
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city’s salvation.36 This reliance on Blackford’s account, as opposed to the primary 
documentation, demonstrates the importance of secondary recollections of the battle in 
establishing its history, and also highlights the perpetuation of the myth of the Battle of 
Lynchburg in the historical memory of many of the people of central Virginia.
These accounts establish their own story of the battle, often despite contradictory primary 
evidence. During the years after the end of the Civil War, the story of the Battle of Lynchburg 
transformed into a myth illustrating the strength of Confederate leadership and the bold sacrifices 
of Confederate soldiers through the exaggeration, and sometimes the invention, of certain facts 
of the story in published recollections of the battle. What’s important in this discussion, 
however, is not that this disparity exists between the primary and secondary accounts, but rather 
the reason behind it.
The people of Lynchburg and central Virginia likely re-emphasized certain 
aspects, and embellished or engineered others, at first to re-establish their sense of honor 
after a defeat not only to their military but to southern culture, and later to establish a 
sense of community in a rapidly changing social atmosphere. Foster notes the 
importance of Confederate veteran organizations in the development and dissemination 
of transformations in the memory of the Civil War. He states that in the assessment of 
historical memory of the Civil War, one must understand, “who controlled these postwar 
Confederate organizations (and thereby served as keepers of the past), how southerners 
responded to these groups, what these groups had to say about the war, and what their 
rituals meant.”37 In the case of the Battle of Lynchburg, the Garland-Rodes Camp of 
Confederate Veterans functioned as the most important organization in the development
36 Halsey, 21-28.
37 Foster, 5.
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of the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg, as Blackford’s remarks were first made in a 
speech to the organization, and Tipton Jennings served as the chairman of the 
organization during the time when his remarks were published. The leaders of the 
organization, as Foster asserts, functioned as keepers of the past. The people of central 
Virginia demonstrated a penchant for this type of war recollection, resulting in the 
publication and distribution of Blackford’s remarks shortly after the initial speech -  so 
much so that a decade later, Jennings could simply refer to it as “Blackford’s pamphlet.”
The fact that the historical recollections made by members of this group gained such 
widespread popularity -  yet simultaneously conflicted with primary accounts, or at the 
very least contained undocumented information -  highlights how the myth of the Battle 
of Lynchburg developed as a way to comfort and affirm a society so drastically shaken.
Rather than deal with the embarrassment of defeat and the challenges of reconstruction, 
the people of Lynchburg could focus, with a growing sense of sentimentality, on certain 
aspects of the battle itself to honor the extraordinary abilities and immense sacrifices of 
their people.
David W. Blight as well speaks to the factors behind the development of Civil War myth 
and memory:
American culture romance triumphed over reality, sentimental remembrance won 
over ideological memory For Americans broadly, the Civil War has been a 
defining event upon which we have often imposed unity and continuity; as a 
culture, we have often preferred its music and pathos to its enduring challenges, 
the theme of reconciled conflict to resurgent, unresolved legacies The greatest 
enthusiasts for Civil War history and memory often displace complicated 
consequences by endlessly focusing on the contest itself...Deeply embedded in an 
American mythology of mission, and serving as a mother lode of nostalgia for 
antimodernists and military history buffs, the Civil War remains very difficult to 
shuck from its shell of sentimentalism.38
38 Blight, 5.
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Again, the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg that developed between the end of the war and the 
early twentieth century fits well with Blight’s paradigm. Blight establishes the idea that 
Americans living in the wake of the Civil War could more easily unite around the ideas of shared 
sacrifice and honor than they could through the reconciliation of the racial issues that were at the 
heart of the war to begin with. Blight states, “sometimes reconciliations have terrible costs, both 
intentional and unseen. The sectional reunion after so horrible a civil war was a political triumph 
by the late nineteenth century, but it could not have been achieved without the resubjugation of 
many of those people whom the war had freed from centuries of bondage.”39 It seems very 
plausible then that the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg developed as a way to re-establish the 
social unity of the Old South and re-affirm the honor of the Confederate war effort.
Additionally, the Civil War, particularly in its latter stages, had an impact on civilians 
that was both broader and more severe than in previous wars in North America. A number of 
works pay particular attention to the psychological effects of experiencing violence and death on 
such a wide scale. These psychological effects, in turn, may have influenced the development 
and transformation of the myth and memory of the Battle of Lynchburg. Drew Gilpin Faust 
discusses the many ways Americans dealt with death during and after the Civil War. She points 
out how nineteenth-century Americans had to develop ways to deal with this level of death, and 
Faust asserts, “Americans had to identify -  find, invent, create -  the means and mechanisms to 
manage more than a half a million dead: their deaths, their bodies, their loss.”40 In this instance, 
the people of central Virginia used the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg, initially, as a mechanism 
to manage this loss. In Alan Nolan’s essay “Civil War History and the Myth of the Lost Cause,”
39 Blight, 3.
40 Ibid, xviii.
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he describes how there exists, “an idealization of the Confederate soldier in the Lost Cause 
myth” to help assuage this feeling of loss and defeat.41 Secondary recollections of the battle tend 
to emphasize this idea of shared sacrifice, partially assuaging the burden of death, as Captain 
Jennings did in his opening remarks. Halsey’s account of the battle also begins by honoring the 
“invincible legions” with their “dauntless and deathless spirit of valor.”42 This focus on the 
shared sacrifice of those who fought and died defending Lynchburg, and the imploration to 
appropriately honor them, suggests that the myth of the Battle of Lynchburg may have developed 
as a way of dealing with the death tolls of the Civil War.
The events of the Battle of Lynchburg and how people dealt with their aftermath 
significantly impacted the development of the myth and the historical memory of the people of 
central Virginia. The impact of the battle on individuals and communities affected how they 
would remember the conflict years later, and how that history would be passed on to the next 
generation. Thomas Desjardin explores how the story of a battle can shape historical memory. 
Although he focuses on a much larger battle, Gettysburg, in order to make assertions about how 
the Civil War developed in historical memory in all of the United States, this connection 
reinforces the idea that the story of the Battle of Lynchburg could have transformed the historical 
memory of the people of Central Virginia. In discussing how similar disparities exist between 
the primary and secondary accounts of the Battle of Gettysburg, Desjardin notes that “Their 
divergence from fact demonstrates more about how human nature affects memory than any 
intentional deception on their part.” He continues, noting that “In trying to slant the meaning of 
Gettysburg in the direction of their cultural views, a number of leading veterans (particularly
41 Alan Nolan, “Civil War History and the Myth of the Lost Cause: National Consequences of
Civil War Battle” In Battle: the Nature and Consequences o f Civil War Combat, ed
Gramm, Kent (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2008), 117.
42 Halsey, 15.
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vanquished postwar Confederates) contrived, invented, and flat out lied, knowing that they were 
building a record on which future generations would judge the past.”43 The development of the 
story of the Battle of Lynchburg seems to fit this model exactly: addresses to Confederate 
veterans organizations and later publications shaped the story of the Battle of Lynchburg, and 
after their introduction served as the factual basis for the majority of subsequent historical 
investigations of the battle.
Desjardin also places focus on veterans’ organizations, stating, “veteran groups 
collaborated to establish a mythology for future generations to absorb.”44 This again reinforces 
the idea that the speeches of the members of the Garland-Rodes Camp of Confederate Veterans 
functioned as an extremely important mechanism through which this myth could be established 
and disseminated. Most poignantly, Desjardin describes how “Given the flawed memories of 
thousands of veterans and their complex web of communicating ideas and forming various 
versions of the battle story, mistaken tales, myths, and legends were virtually inevitable.”45 
These assertions support the idea that the myth and memory of the Battle of Lynchburg 
developed to serve specific functions in the lives of the people of central Virginia.
In his more general discussion of historical memory in the American South, W. Fitzhugh 
Brundage describes how “the remembered past and debates about it have a deep significance for 
both public life and regional identity in the American South.”46 This seems particularly true in 
the case of Lynchburg and the memory of its Civil War battle. Brundage continues, noting, 
“Historical memory, consequently, transmits selective knowledge about the past. By discerning
43 Thomas Desjardin, These Honored Dead (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2003), 41-42.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 58.
46 W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Where These Memories Grow (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2000), 2.
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patterns in the past and attaching significance to events, groups create interpretative frameworks 
that make ‘the flux of experience comprehensive.’”47 In order to help regain a sense of identity 
after a crushing defeat and to help re-establish their old sense of community in a time of rapid 
social change, key speakers and writers in Lynchburg embellished certain elements of the Battle 
of Lynchburg, and flatly engineered others in order to establish their interpretation.
The contemporary accounts of the Battle of Lynchburg differ greatly with the secondary 
recollections that began to appear in the early twentieth century. While the story of Jubal Early’s 
trains represents the most detailed and colorful example of this, the disparities in the details -  the 
troop numbers, the necessity of reinforcement at the time of Early’s arrival and the subsequent 
response, in addition to the character of the men on both sides -  supply an equally important 
element of the story. Further, whether or not the story of Jubal Early’s trains is true seems 
irrelevant. If it is not true, then the fact that Charles Blackford either invented or became the first 
to publicly discuss this story in 1901 deeply reflects the need of the people of the early twentieth 
century in central Virginia to re-establish their honor and dominance in the aftermath of heavy 
personal and cultural losses. That the story developed from factual, primary accounts noting a 
seemingly balanced encounter marked by heavy skirmishing, and an uneventful Union retreat 
into one where heroic Confederate officers and soldiers arrived just in time to save the city with 
cunning, strategy, and valiant sacrifice from the cowardly, cruel, and far more numerous Union 
Army demonstrates the social and cultural needs of the people of central Virginia in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After a long war in which countless soldiers and 
civilians died alongside the institution that formed the center of southern social structure,
47 Ibid, 5.
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Southerners needed something to assist them in overcoming this trauma of defeat: for many, the 
myth and memory of the civil war served this purpose.
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